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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Sams was charged with felony aggravated assault and use of a deadly
weapon in the commission of a crime. Following his jury trial, a jury found Mr. Sams
guilty of the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor disturbing the peace. Mr. Sams
appealed, asserting the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of
a standoff between Mr. Sams and police that occurred after the alleged incident at
issue. The standoff evidence was Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”)
evidence of other acts, and was inadmissible because the State failed to serve notice.
The district court’s ultimate determination that the standoff evidence was not Rule
404(b) evidence was arbitrary and outside the boundaries of its discretion.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues this Court should decline to consider
Mr. Sams’ issue on appeal because he did not present argument and authority on the
standoff evidence being admissible as res gestae or to show consciousness of guilt.
(Resp. Br., pp.8-11.) The State further argues admission of the standoff evidence was
proper as both res gestae and to show consciousness of guilt, even if the district court
did not admit the evidence on those grounds. (Resp. Br., pp.11-14.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to show the State’s arguments are meritless,
because they ignore the notice provisions of Rule 404(b). Mr. Sams asserts on appeal
the standoff evidence was inadmissible because the State failed to comply with the
notice provisions of Rule 404(b). Even if the standoff evidence were relevant for a nonpropensity purpose such as res gestae or consciousness of guilt, the standoff evidence
was still inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the State failed to serve notice.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Sams’ Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the standoff
between Mr. Sams and the police on the basis it was not Idaho Criminal Rule 404(b)
evidence, despite the court’s earlier ruling the evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Evidence Of The Standoff On
The Basis It Was Not Idaho Rule Of Evidence 404(b) Evidence, Because The Court
Earlier Ruled The Standoff Evidence Was Rule 404(b) Evidence
A.

Introduction
Mr. Sams asserts the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

evidence of the standoff on the basis it was not Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b)
evidence, because the court earlier ruled the standoff was Rule 404(b) evidence.
The standoff evidence was evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of
Rule 404(b).

Because the State failed to serve notice, the standoff evidence was

inadmissible. The State’s arguments that the standoff evidence was admissible are
meritless because they ignore the notice provisions of Rule 404(b).
The district court’s ultimate determination admitting the standoff evidence on the
basis it was not Rule 404(b) evidence, was arbitrary and outside the boundaries of the
court’s discretion.

Further, the State has not proven the district court’s error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Mr. Sams’ judgment of conviction should
be vacated and the case should be remanded to the district court.
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B.

The Standoff Evidence Was Evidence Of Other Acts Subject To The Strictures
Of Rule 404(b)
Mr. Sams asserts that the standoff evidence was evidence of other acts subject

to the strictures of Rule 404(b). See I.R.E. 404(b). In the Respondent’s Brief, the State
appears to concede the standoff evidence was Rule 404(b) evidence of other acts,
because the State argues the standoff evidence was admissible as res gestae or to
show consciousness of guilt. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-14.)
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., p.11), to be admissible under
Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts “must be relevant to a material and disputed issue
concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52
(2009). Evidence of other acts may be admissible under Rule 404(b) if it is res gestae,
a term referring to “other acts that occur during the commission of or in close temporal
proximity to the charged offense which must be described to complete the story of the
crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous
happenings.” See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-19 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And as Mr. Sams previously discussed (App. Br., pp.10-11),
Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized consciousness of guilt as a non-propensity
purpose for the admission of other acts evidence under Rule 404(b). State v. Ehrlick,
158 Idaho 900, 917 (2015); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463 (Ct. App. 2010).
Thus, by arguing the district court admitted the standoff evidence as res gestae
or to show consciousness of guilt (see Resp. Br., pp.8-11), and by arguing the standoff
evidence was properly admitted on those grounds even if the district court did not so
admit it (see Resp. Br., pp.11-14), the State appears to concede the standoff evidence
was evidence of other acts subject to the strictures of Rule 404(b).
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C.

The Standoff Evidence Was Inadmissible Because The State Failed To
Serve Notice
The standoff evidence was inadmissible because the State failed to serve notice

as required by Rule 404(b).

(See Tr., p.118, Ls.20-22.)

Further, the district court

excused the State’s failure to serve notice not because of good cause shown under
Rule 404(b), but because the district court determined the standoff evidence was not
Rule 404(b) evidence. (See Tr., p.119, Ls.2-15.) Because the State failed to comply
with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b), the standoff evidence was inadmissible. See
State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008).
In the Respondent’s Brief, the State has not offered any argument or authority
showing that the State complied with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b) or that the
State’s failure to comply with the notice provisions should be excused on good cause
shown. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-17.) Thus, any argument from the State concerning the
State’s failure to comply with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b) should not be
considered by this Court. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
Rather than address Mr. Sams’ assertion on appeal that the State did not comply
with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b), the State argues this Court should disregard
Mr. Sams’ issue on appeal because he “has not presented argument and authority to
show that the district court’s reliance on either the res gestae principle or the
‘consciousness of guilt’ ground is erroneous.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) The State’s argument
is meritless because it ignores the notice provisions of Rule 404(b).
Mr. Sams asserted before the district court that he was entitled to notice of the
standoff evidence under Rule 404(b). (See Tr., p.114, Ls.24-25.) The district court
acknowledged there was no Rule 404(b) notice by the State. (See Tr., p.118, Ls.20-
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22.) To dispel any confusion the State may have, Mr. Sams has not asserted on appeal
the standoff evidence was inadmissible because it was not relevant for a purpose other
than propensity. Rather, Mr. Sams’ assertion on appeal is the standoff evidence was
inadmissible because the State failed to serve notice as required by Rule 404(b). (App.
Br., pp.12-13.)
Even if the standoff evidence were relevant for a non-propensity purpose such as
res gestae or consciousness of guilt, the standoff evidence was still inadmissible under
Rule 404(b) because the State failed to serve notice. As in Sheldon, “[b]ecause the
State failed to comply with the notice provisions of I.R.E. 404(b),” the standoff evidence
as other acts evidence was “inadmissible” against Mr. Sams. See Sheldon, 145 Idaho
at 230. The State’s argument this Court should disregard Mr. Sams’ issue on appeal is
therefore meritless.
The State’s argument this Court should affirm the district court’s decision
because the standoff evidence was properly admissible on grounds of res gestae and
consciousness of guilt, even if the district court did not admit the standoff evidence on
the basis of res gestae (see Resp. Br., pp.11-12), is likewise meritless. The evidence
was inadmissible not because it was not relevant for a purpose other than propensity,
but because the State failed to comply with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b). See
Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230. Adopting the State’s argument would contradict Sheldon
and eviscerate the notice provisions of Rule 404(b).
The State failed to comply with the notice provisions of Rule 404(b), and the
standoff evidence was therefore inadmissible. See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230.
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D.

The District Court’s Ultimate Determination That The Standoff Evidence Was Not
Rule 404(b) Evidence Was Arbitrary And Outside The Boundaries Of The District
Court’s Discretion
By determining the standoff evidence was admissible because it was not

Rule 404(b) evidence, the district court contradicted its earlier ruling that the evidence
was Rule 404(b) evidence. Mr. Sams asserts the district court’s ultimate determination
that the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence was arbitrary, and therefore
outside the boundaries of the district court’s discretion. Because the district court’s
ultimate determination that the standoff evidence was not Rule 404(b) evidence was
outside the boundaries of the district court’s discretion, the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the standoff evidence. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,
600 (1989).
In attempting to counter the above assertion, the State seems to abandon its
earlier apparent concession that the standoff evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b). The State contends “the court’s initial ruling stated a ‘not Rule 404(b) evidence’
basis (i.e., res gestae) for admitting such testimony. The notice issue merely served to
eliminate the 404(b) ground for admitting ‘standoff’ testimony, but left the non 404(b)
grounds (i.e., res gestae and ‘consciousness of guilt’) intact.” (Resp. Br., p.14 (citation
omitted).)

Put otherwise, the State now contends the standoff evidence was not

admitted under Rule 404(b). (See Resp. Br., p.14.)
Much like the district court, the State has seemingly flip-flopped on whether the
standoff evidence was other acts evidence subject to the strictures of Rule 404(b).
Contrary to the argument by the State that the standoff evidence was not admitted
under Rule 404(b), the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of
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Appeals instruct that other acts evidence admissible as res gestae or to show
consciousness of guilt are subject to Rule 404(b). See, e.g., Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 917;
Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 17-19. Thus, even if the evidence were relevant for the nonpropensity purposes of res gestae or consciousness of guilt, because the standoff
evidence was evidence of other acts, the State was required to provide notice as
required by Rule 404(b). See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230. As shown above, the State
failed to serve notice, and the standoff evidence was inadmissible.
E.

The State Has Not Proven That The District Court’s Error Was Harmless Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Sams asserts his judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case

should be remanded, because the State has not proven that the district court’s error in
admitting the standoff evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

See

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an error as harmless, an appellate
court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
The State has not proven that the district court’s abuse of discretion was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State’s argument to the contrary is not
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remarkable (see Resp. Br., pp.14-17), and no further reply is necessary. Accordingly,
Mr. Sams refers the Court to pages 16-17 of the Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Sams respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
his case to the district court.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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